We study the rise of the Sweden Democrats, a radical-right party that rose from negligible size in 2002 to Swedenís third largest party in 2014. We use comprehensive data to study both its politicians (supply side) and voters (demand side). All political candidates for the party can be identiÖed in register data, which also lets us aggregate individual social and economic conditions in municipalities or voting districts and relate them to the partyís vote share. We take a starting point in two key economic events: (i) a series of policy reforms in 2006-2011 that signiÖcantly widened the disposable- income gap between ìinsidersîand ìoutsidersîin the labor market, and (ii) the Önancial-crisis recession that doubled the job-loss risk for ìvulnerableî vs ìsecureîinsiders. On the supply side, the Sweden Democrats over-represent both losing groups relative to the population, whereas all other parties under-represent them, results which also hold when we disaggregate across time, subgroups, and municipalities. On th demand side, the local increase in the insider-outsider income gap, as well as the share of vulnerable insiders, are systematically associated with larger electoral gains for the Sweden Democrats. These Öndings can be given a citizen-candidate interpretation: economic losers (as we demonstrate) decrease their trust in established parties and institutions. As a result, some economic losers became Sweden-Democrat candidates, and many more supported the party electorally to obtain greater descriptive representation. This way, Swedish politics became potentially more inclusive. But the politicians elected for the Sweden Democrats score lower on expertise, moral values, and social trust ñas do their voters which made local political selection less valence oriented.