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Disadvantaged boys benefit most from early school years

Research by Christian Dustmann and Thomas Cornelissen finds that boys from disadvantaged backgrounds benefit most from early schooling, helping to narrow the skills gap (60-80%) with boys from high socio-economic backgrounds.

Press Release

Discussion Paper

UCL News

The Times

The Indepedent

Tes

Housing costs have exacerbated income equality in Germany

CReAM Research by Christian Dustmann and co-authors finds that changes in housing expenditures dramatically exacerbated the rise in income inequality in Germany since the mid-1990s. The research was covered on the German press.

Press Release

Discussion Paper

VoxEU

FAZ

UCL News

Immigrant and disadvantaged children benefit most from early childcare

Attending universal childcare from age three significantly improves the school readiness of children from immigrant and disadvantaged family backgrounds.

Press Release

Discussion Paper

iNews

UCL News

FAZ

VoxEU

 

Brexit

BBC Three Counties

Christian Dustmann discussing Theresa May's comments on EU workers 'jumping the queue' on BBC Three Counties.

CReAM seminar

CReAM - Seminar in Applied Economics Series
Benjamin Friedrich (Kellogg School of Management)

“Internal Labor Markets and the Competition for Managerial Talent”

Event date: Monday 4th March 2019
Time: 4:00-5:30 Place: TBC Speaker Room: 224

This paper studies how firms use internal promotions and external hiring to recruit managers. Using matched employer-employee data from Denmark, I document that more productive firms hire more talented trainees, are more likely to promote managers internally, and match with better managers in terms of education and ability. Based on these facts, I develop an assignment model of the market for managers with two-sided heterogeneity. In the model internal labor markets arise from asymmetric learning and firm-specific human capital. Production complementarities between firm productivity and manager talent result in better firms investing in promising workers and in developing talent through firm-specific training and internal promotion. I estimate the model using Danish data. Model simulations indicate that reducing information frictions increases aggregate productivity but leads to higher wage inequality because better signals of talent increase competition for the best managers. This mechanism provides a new market-driven explanation for the increase in upper-tail wage inequality.